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BENNETT*

What motivates substantive presumptionsabout how to interpret statutes? Are they
like statisticalheuristics that aim to predict Congress's most likely behavior, or are
they meant to protect certain underenforced values against inadvertent legislative
encroachment? These two rationales,fact-based and value-based, are the extremes
of a continuum. This Note uses the presumption against extraterritoriality to
demonstrate this continuum and how a presumption can shift along it. The presumption operates to diminish the likelihood that a federal statute will be read to
extend beyond the borders of the United States. The presumption has been remarkably stable for decades despite watershed changes in the principles-customary
internationallaw and conflict of laws-that once supported it. As the presumption's
normative justifications have diminished, a new justification has grown in importance. Today, the presumption is often justified as a stand-in for how Congress
typically legislates. This Note argues that this change makes the presumption less
defensible but even harder to overcome in individual cases.
INTRODUCTION

Substantive canons of statutory interpretation are judicial rules of
thumb about how to read the language of a statute and are derived
from extratextual policy rationales. By definition, they support one
reading of a statute and cast doubt on others. Given competing plausible interpretations of a statute, why should courts rely on a rule that
consistently favors one set of outcomes over another? Reasons vary
across canons, and justifications for individual canons may not remain
fixed, but instead may evolve over time. As Judge Posner has put it,
"[o]ld rules sometimes accrete new rationales as the original rationales fall to changed circumstances."' Because legal reasoning
depends not only on outcomes but also on rationales, new rationales
should be analyzed according to their own merits to determine
whether they truly support the old rules they are meant to justify.
* Copyright © 2012 by Thomas B. Bennett. J.D. Candidate, 2012, New York
University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Swarthmore College. I would like to thank John
Ferejohn for his useful guidance during the course of writing this Note. I am grateful to
Barry Friedman, Samuel Issacharoff, Rachel Barkow, Cristina Rodriguez, and Daryl
Levinson for their comments. I am also indebted to the members of the Furman Academic
Scholars Program, particularly Kirti Datla and Jeremy Peterman, for reading previous
drafts. Finally, I would like to thank Lauren Hume, Brian Levy, and Mike Biondi for
editing this Note. All errors are my own.
1 Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1993).
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The presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes is an example of a substantive canon of statutory interpretation.
For nearly two centuries, the presumption has served to resolve statutory ambiguities by narrowly tailoring federal statutes to prevent
their application beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States. In its earliest, eighteenth-century form, this presumption was a
transsubstantive rule of comity designed to prevent clashes with the
laws of other nations. Soon thereafter, this presumption fused with
another value and became justified by a similar desire to avoid constructions of statutes that might violate the robust, territorial notion of
sovereignty that was the paradigm of international law at the time.2
With such a strong background norm in favor of territoriality, a strong
presumption against interpretations of statutes that violated this territorial view of sovereignty was warranted. Since territorial sovereignty
applied across nearly all areas of the law, 3 the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied widely as well.
During the twentieth century, the neat identity between the rationale and the scope of the presumption began to break down. Notions
of sovereignty became more complex than they had been in the early
nineteenth century. In many areas of law-particularly those in which
the effects of violations could be felt across borders-spheres of jurisdiction began to overlap. 4 Despite these changes in the normative
background that once girded the presumption against extraterritoriality, the presumption itself remained, and remains, quite strong.
The Supreme Court continued to apply this canon of statutory interpretation consistently even though its justifications for doing so
changed. Most recently, in searching for supplemental justifications,
the Court has begun to articulate the presumption as a norm of
adherence to typical congressional behavior, enforcing statutory interpretations it believes to be consonant with the way in which,Congress
ordinarily legislates. 5 This transformation suggests a puzzle: While
justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality have
changed, the presumption itself has not. How can this result be
explained?

2 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the territorial theory of jurisdiction).
3 See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 10-16 (1992) (explaining the territorial sovereignty approach to law
widely accepted by courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
4 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the decline in territoriality using antitrust and procedural due process as examples).
5 See infra Part II.B.3-5 (describing the evolution of the new rationale for the
extraterritoriality presumption).
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Recently, the Supreme Court used its discretionary supervisory
power to reinforce the strength of the presumption against extraterritoriality. In Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank Ltd. (Morrison),6 the

Court reprimanded the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for
disregarding this "longstanding principle of American law"'7 and catalogued the various ways in which the court of appeals had contorted
its decisions to avoid applying the presumption." According to the
Court, the Second Circuit's alternate doctrines lacked "a textual or
even extratextual basis."9 The Court marshaled to its cause a phalanx
of scholarly criticism of the Second Circuit's approach.10 However, the
Second Circuit's decision, which the Supreme Court ultimately
affirmed despite the biting nature of the majority opinion," rested on
relatively straightforward jurisdictional grounds and reached essentially the same result. 12
This fuss about a mere canon of statutory interpretation seems
quixotic, especially given Professor Llewellyn's famous demonstration
that canons are so plastic that they often can be self-refuting. 13 Given
6 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). In Morrison, the Court reasoned that section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), does not apply extraterritorially because there is no "affirmative indication" of such application in the legislation.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
7 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991)).
8 See id. at 2878-79 (surveying Second Circuit jurisprudence using the conduct and
effects tests for when the Securities Exchange Act applies).
9 Id. at 2879.
10 See id. at 2880-81 (citing commentators who noted the inconsistent extraterritorial
application of the Securities Exchange Act and argued that Congress's silence on the issue
did not mean the statute applies extraterritorially).
11 See id. at 2888 (affirming the dismissal of the complaint). Although Morrison
involved two interlocked questions-the territoriality question and the question of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange Act-the Court clarified that it affirmed
on the basis that the complaint had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted
under the statute. Id. The decisions below had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See id. at 2876
(explaining the procedural history of the case). The line between the subject matter jurisdiction question and the merits question of extraterritoriality is very difficult to draw in this
context.
12 Id. at 2888 (affirming the decision of the Second Circuit on the grounds that petitioner failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted); see also Morrison v. Nat'1
Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008) ("This particular mix of factors ... add[s]
up to a determination that we lack subject matter jurisdiction."), aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 2869
(2010). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment and wrote
an opinion that would have also dismissed the claim but did not apply the presumption.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring).
13 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisionand the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950)
(showing that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point" by contrasting
twenty-eight canons and counter-canons).
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the Supreme Court's limited docket, why would the Court grant certiorari to enforce precedent that has seemingly little policy impact?
Although it is undoubtedly the Court's prerogative to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of federal law, 14 the aggressiveness and
rhetorical force of the Court's opinion in Morrison suggest additional
motivations. Even as the Court was deciding Morrison, it granted certiorari in another case involving the presumption against extraterritoriality 15-only to deadlock 4-416-Suggesting that the Court will
continue to address the presumption. 7 This urgency to address cases
touching on the presumption against extraterritoriality, combined
with the cases' significance, suggests that the Justices take the continued vitality of the presumption extremely seriously.18
The presumption against extraterritoriality is interesting not
solely for its impact on case outcomes but also because it demonstrates the way in which canons of interpretation can change over
time. At times, the presumption against extraterritoriality has been
described as a "clear statement" rule.19 Such rules operate when
judges decline to interpret statutes as having a certain type of application unless the statutory language meets a high threshold of clarity.
Unlike textual canons, clear statement rules are rarely normatively
neutral-in fact, one of their most common justifications is that they
serve to ensure underenforced values like federalism. 20 Because of
14 See Eugene Gressman, Much Ado About Uniformity, 52 GEO. L.J. 742, 755 (1964)
(arguing, and collecting statements of Supreme Court Chief Justices to the effect that, the
purpose of Supreme Court certiorari practice is to ensure uniformity of federal law); cf
Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157,
158-59 (1953) (arguing that lower-court federal-question jurisdiction, supervised by the
Supreme Court, promotes uniformity better than would a system in which the Supreme
Court directly reviewed state court decisions implicating questions of federal law).
15Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010).
16 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (per curiam).
17 The case dealt with the extraterritoriality vel non of the "first sale" doctrine of copyright law. Both parties' merits briefs in the Supreme Court included extended discussions
of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Brief for the Petitioner at 29, Costco, 131 S.
Ct. 565 (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 2690584, at *29; Brief for Respondent at 13-14, Costco,
131 S. Ct. 565 (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 3426268, at *13-14. Justice Kagan recused herself.
Costco, 131 S. Ct. at 565.
18See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's
decision in Morrison was part of a "continuing campaign to render the private cause of
action under § 10(b) toothless").
19 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991)
(observing "Congress's awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute
applies overseas"), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109(a), Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006)), as recognized in Arbaugh
v. Y&H Corp. 546 U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006).
20 See infra note 31 and accompanying text (noting such an argument).
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this feature, clear statement rules have been controversial, particularly
in constitutional law. 2 1
This Note proposes a different way of understanding the presumption against extraterritoriality-one that stems from the
observation that not all judicial presumptions are grounded in values.
Some presumptions are merely rough-cut approximations for the way
the world is normally ordered. Particularly in common law areas like
contracts and property, presumptions are frequently justified by factual claims about the way private parties most often stand in relation
to one another. 22 For example, Professor Listokin has argued that
courts often reach outcomes that are consistent with the statistical
application of background base rates when interpreting contracts in a
Bayesian fashion. 23 That is, courts take into account facts about cases
that are factually similar to the ones before them-but that are not
actually before them-to determine the meaning of contracts. The
"base rate" in Listokin's case is the likelihood that any set of contracting parties would prefer a particular interpretation of the
contract. A court will balance the base rate against parties' specific
contract terms that the court must interpret. The further the base rate
is from the intent of the parties in an individual case, the clearer they
must state their intentions to give it legal effect. This type of justification-one that makes resort to something like a statistical claimis just what the Supreme Court has developed to support the
continuing application of the presumption against extraterritoriality. 24
21 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation,67 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 921, 946 (1992) ("The tendency of courts to require clear legislative articulation of
changes in private liberty or property interests is not without its critics."). Professor Popkin
argues that clear statement rules embody an "Article III" approach to statutory interpretation that is fundamentally at odds with "Article I" approaches like textualism and purposivism. William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation,68 IND.
L.J. 865, 881 (1993). Similarly, Professor Eskridge has claimed that normative canons are
"a means by which the Court expresses its underlying ideology in statutory interpretation
cases." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 297 (1994).
22 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 21-22 (1991) (explaining that the default rules in

corporate contracts should look to what the parties would have done had they bargained
explicitly); Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn & Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining
Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in ContractLaw, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 639, 707-09 (1989) (arguing for the use of context in applying default
rules for contracts).
23 See Yair Listokin, Bayesian ContractualInterpretation,39 J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (2010)

(arguing that courts should use Bayesian probabilities-i.e., base rates-to read contracts
because this use would identify situations in which the plain reading of a contract is
unlikely to effectuate the parties' intent).
24 See infra Part II.B.5 (describing how the modern Supreme Court uses primarily factbased justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality).
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In fact, there is a spectrum between fact- and value-based canons
of interpretation. It is not a pure dichotomy. For instance, canons of
interpretation in private law contexts have moved along this spectrum
from value-based justifications to fact-based justifications, but this
phenomenon is rarer in the federal statutory interpretation context. 25
However, as value-based justifications come under increasing criticism
from scholars and judges, other presumptions may follow the presumption against extraterritoriality and move in this fact-based
direction. 26 Although many value-based presumptions are grounded
in values that are at least indirectly derived from the Constitution,
these quasi-constitutional values-such as federalism-historically
have been especially subject to change. 27
This Note argues that, as the presumption against extraterritorial
application of statutes has changed over time, becoming less obviously
justified by any normative concerns, it has become qualitatively different from the value-based type of presumption. Instead, factual
claims about the way Congress typically legislates now provide the
primary justification for the presumption against extraterritoriality. A
bizarre consequence of this shift from a normative to a factual justification is that the presumption against extraterritoriality may be
harder for litigants to overcome in individual cases, rendering the presumption even stronger than it was when more robust normative
values and notions of territorial sovereignty justified it.
This Note seeks to illustrate the way in which canons of interpretation may move along a spectrum of fact- and value-based rationales
over time, using the presumption against extraterritoriality as an
25 See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 925 (arguing that statutory canons are designed to
preserve continuity in the law).
26 For example, in describing the federalism canon, which is traditionally considered a
"normative" canon, the Supreme Court sometimes slips back and forth between describing
how Congress should act and how Congress is presumed to act. Compare Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) ("This plain statement rule is nothing more than an
acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere."), with Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (requiring "an unequivocal
expression of congressional intent" to overturn sovereign immunity because of "the vital
role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system").
27 As early as 1789, there was significant debate about the importance of federalism in
the new national system. Some New England Federalists were even willing to submit to
some form of republican monarchy. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 54-55
(2009) ("By 1789 many of the Federalists had lost faith in the Revolutionary dream of
1776-that America could exist with a minimum of government."). After the Jeffersonian
Revolution, the pole of power swung back to the states. Id. at 467 ("Although the power of
the federal government certainly declined in the decades following Jefferson's election as
president, the public authority, the police powers, and the regulatory rights of the states
and their municipalities grew stronger.").
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example. Part I defines the endpoints of the spectrum, introducing a
schema that sorts canons of statutory interpretation into two groups:
ones that are justified by claims about values and ones that are justified by factual claims. Part II demonstrates that the presumption
against extraterritoriality has moved along the spectrum from a valuebased to a fact-based presumption. This Part traces the presumption's
history from its early roots as the CharmingBetsy canon 28 through its
application in Morrison, paying particular attention to the justifications articulated for the presumption across time. Part III
evaluates the presumption in light of its transformation and determines two types of hurdles to rebutting it in individual cases-one
definitional and one practical. The Note concludes by considering the
perverse result that fact-based canons may be harder to rebut with
case-specific facts than their value-based counterparts. This result suggests that a weaker form of the presumption would better accord with
its current, weaker justifications and practical applications. The
broader conclusion is that, to the degree more and more presumptions
are justified by empirical claims, they ought to be empirically
contestable.
I
A

SPECTRUM OF JUDICIAL PRESUMPTIONS

Judicial presumptions generally require justification. This is particularly true in the statutory interpretation context because of the
role assigned to judges. The traditional understanding of the judicial
function is that judges do their best to ascertain the meaning of a law
and apply it to the facts of particular cases. 29 When a judge employs a
presumption, she adopts an interpretation that may differ from the
one she would have developed relying solely on the text-and
perhaps legislative history-of the statute in question. While a presumption may not by itself be sufficient to authorize broad departure
from the plain meaning of a statute, it will often justify moderate
departures in cases of statutory ambiguity. The question then
becomes, what kinds of justifications are necessary to support a
presumption?
28 See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (explaining the Charming Betsy
canon).
29 See, e.g., ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 134 (2d ed.
2005) (justifying an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation by reference to a

Razian account of authority); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 284 (1989) ("[I]t is the courts' role to carry out congressional
directives in light of their understanding of the Constitution.").
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In this Part, I propose that justifications for canons of statutory
interpretation may be usefully categorized along a spectrum with two
endpoints. The first endpoint characterizes presumptions based wholly
on normative values, often imported from other parts of the law. In
general, value-based presumptions promote equilibrium between conflicting areas of law by helping judges mediate between opposing legal
values. For example, one value-based presumption is the canon that
counsels judges to interpret statutes so as to avoid creating constitutional problems.30 One justification for this canon is that statutes can
impinge particularly sharply against values that are hard to define, like
structural constitutional values such as federalism.31 These canons
help to expand the scope of the judge's view beyond one narrow provision of law to include the vast web of sources of legal authority,
parts of which may conflict with the apparent meaning of the statute
at issue. 32 The result is a body of law that is more harmonized.
The second endpoint of the spectrum of rationales describes presumptions that are rooted in facts about the world. Rather than
incorporating other legal authorities, these fact-based presumptions
bring additional facts to bear on a question of interpretation. Factbased presumptions avoid focusing narrowly on the circumstances
that prompted a legislature to enact a particular law by referring to
the universe of facts that motivates similarly situated, actual legislatures. Presumptions with fact-based rationales are comparatively less
familiar in the statutory interpretation context, even though they may
be very familiar to common law judges. For example, judges in probate disputes very often interpret wills to conform to the intent of
similarly situated grantors.33
Other scholars' proposals for categorizing canons of interpretation differently have failed to identify the category of fact-based
canons as derived from empirical observations about congressional
behavior. For example, Professor Ross proposes a distinction between
30 Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
of Judicial Review, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1549, 1585-93 (2000) (arguing that the constitutional
avoidance canon is "a useful mechanism for realizing important constitutional values").
31 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 399, 403 (2010) ("[S]ome defend such rules as judicially administrable tools for protecting so-called 'underenforced constitutional norms'-principles such as the separation
of powers and federalism, which are integral to the constitutional scheme but whose details
often cannot be convincingly articulated at the level of individual cases.").
32 See Shapiro,supra note 21, at 960 (arguing that courts use canons when interpreting
statutes to fulfill their "responsibility to accommodate change to a complex and relatively
stable structure of rules and principles").
33 See Browning v. Sacrison, 518 P.2d 656, 659 (Or. 1974) (affirming a trial court that
used a "construction which conforms more closely to the intent commonly prevalent
among conveyors similarly situated" to interpret the remainder provision of a devise).
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"descriptive" and "normative" canons, in which "descriptive" canons
"involve predictions as to what the legislature must have meant." 34
Despite Ross's recognition that likely legislative intent plays an
important role for some canons, his "descriptive" category includes
canons such as ejusdem generis and presumptions against internal
inconsistency that are not obviously fact-based.35 Similarly, Professor
Bamberger describes "normative" canons as those that are
"inspired . . . by the substantive and structural concerns of the
Constitution." 36 In the same vein, Professors Frickey and Eskridge
have drawn the distinction between "substantive," "textual," and
"extrinsic source" canons.37 In other words, most of the categories for
distinctions among canons of interpretation are either overinclusive or
underinclusive compared to the distinction this Note proposes
because they do not identify those canons that are neither textual nor
normative. The following two sections explore in more depth my
distinction between value- and fact-based presumptions in order to
facilitate a discussion in Part II about how the presumption against
extraterritoriality has shifted along the spectrum over time.38
A.

Value-Based Presumptions

According to the model this Note proposes, value-based presumptions are justified by piggybacking on the desirable features of
their underlying values. These presumptions are worthwhile because
they help to promote the values upon which they are based, which in
turn are things society thinks are worth promoting. This two-step relationship-the instrumental worth of the presumption and the ultimate
desirability of the underlying values-is both a strength and a
weakness of value-based justifications. On one hand, value-based presumptions often bootstrap a convincing menu of rationales for their
use: the reasons supporting the underlying value. On the other hand,
value-based presumptions cannot capture all of the benefits of the
34 Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992).

35 Indeed, it is difficult to know whether Congress meant for like terms to be given like
meaning, since that is the very question interpreting courts must decide.
36 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008).
37 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 TermForeword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 97 (1994) (categorizing in an
appendix the Rehnquist Court's canons of statutory interpretation). Eskridge and Frickey
categorized the presumption against extraterritoriality as a common law "substantive
policy" canon. Id. at 107.
38 In the following sections, I speak of "value-based presumptions" and "fact-based
presumptions".for simplicity, but I intend to draw a distinction between the endpoints on
the spectrum of rationales underlying presumptions.
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underlying value because the presumption might not apply in all
circumstances in which the value would be relevant. Put differently,
value-based presumptions may inefficiently safeguard putatively
underenforced norms because they promote the norm in a derivative
or incomplete manner.
At least in theory, this second-order relationship between presumptions and their underlying values allows individual litigants to
rebut the application of a value-based presumption when the values
the presumption protects are not implicated by a particular case. Consider the example of federalism, a value that, for the moment, may be
assumed to be worth promoting for its own sake. There are many
ways to promote federalism. One of those ways is with a presumption
that statutes be read not to upset the state-federal balance. By
applying a presumption in all cases to all statutes, however, courts
may overenforce federalism by assuming that Congress never
intended to change the state-federal balance when Congress may have
possessed that intent. Conversely, federalism issues may appear in
many contexts other than statutes, and if courts rely on a canon of
interpretation as the primary way to promote that value, underprotection of state power may result. Thus, value-based presumptions do not
ensure perfect fidelity to the values they pursue.
Perhaps the best examples of value-based canons of statutory
interpretation are so-called "clear statement rules." 39 They are a
subset of judicial presumptions that require a heightened level of textual clarity to resolve statutory ambiguity in the direction of certain
real-world applications. 40 The most commonly invoked clear statement rules protect-and are therefore justified by reference toconstitutional values like federalism 4 1 and separation of powers42 that
judges believe would be underenforced otherwise. For example, the
federalism clear statement rule is justified by, among other things,
promotion of state experimentation, protection from tyranny, efficiency, individual choice, and citizen participation. 43 To the extent that
39 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw] (describing substantive canons and
clear statement rules of statutory interpretation as "value choices").
40 Id. at 611-27 (describing the evolution of "super-strong clear statement rules" based
on federalism and the level of clarity each rule requires).
41 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (requiring a
clear statement of congressional intent to override sovereign immunity).
42 See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-66 (1989) (requiring
"firm evidence" to overcome the judicial presumption of constitutional avoidance surrounding a separation of powers issue).
43 For one account of the values of federalism, see Robert P. Inman & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 44-53 (1997). The Supreme
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those ends are worthwhile, that federalism achieves them, and that the
clear statement rule protects federalism, the clear statement rule is
instrumentally valuable in achieving those desired ends.
Clear statement rules have drawn scrutiny in the scholarly
literature because they lack textual authority in the specific statutory
provision being interpreted. This broad criticism can be broken down
into two parts: attacks against the underlying values and attacks
against judicial implementation. First, some observers criticize clear
statement rules as vehicles for imposing unjustified values. For
example, clear statement rules may be framed as imposing an arbitrary "clarity tax" on certain forms of legislation." Similarly, Eskridge
and Frickey argue that clear statement rules may be used to advance
normative values that are not desirable from a policy perspective. 45
Second, clear statement rules arguably are an arbitrary or
undemocratic way of achieving otherwise acceptable policy goals. This
criticism takes issue with the uncertain stringency of the requirement
that Congress issue a "clear statement." 4 6 A stronger version of this
criticism is that it is not obvious at the point of drafting what level of
clarity will be required for a statute to apply in a particular instance,
and therefore the intent of Congress may be thwarted arbitrarily.47
As with all value-based presumptions, clear statement rules vary
widely in scope, applicability, and justification." For example, manyCourt has cited values such as protection of liberty, sensitivity to the varied needs of a
diverse society, experimentation, and competition. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
458 (1991) (listing these as virtues of federalism).
44 Manning, supra note 31, at 403 ("[C]lear statement rules do impose something of a
clarity tax upon legislative proceedings in particular areas . . . .").
45 Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 39, at 629-45 (expressing
skepticism that the imposition of values through clear statement rules is desirable). Of
course, which normative values one finds undesirable is largely a question of one's own
political beliefs.
46 See Michael P. Lee, Note, How Clear Is "Clear"?: A Lenient Interpretationof the
Gregory v. Ashcroft Clear Statement Rule, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 256 (1998) ("Uncertainty over the precise nature of the Gregory [clear statement] test has led federal courts to
disagree over the applicability of important federal legislation to the states.").
47 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 280-85 (describing how clear statement rules, and

the presumption against extraterritoriality in particular, may be inconsistent and plastic in
their applicability from case to case); William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY

J.

INT'L L. 85, 85-86 (1998) (noting that the

strength of the presumption against extraterritoriality has changed over time); Manning,
supra note 31, at 442 ("[A] free-form version of structural inference [based on a background value] authorizes judges to go outside-that is, to shift-the level of generality set
by those who bargained over the means, as well as the ends, of the relevant constitutional
provisions.").
48 Eskridge and Frickey identify at least a dozen clear statement rules, among them a
presumption in favor of judicial review, a presumption in favor of tribal immunity from
state regulation, and a host of federalism canons. Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law, supra note 39, at 601-02, 609-11, 619-29.
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but by no means all-clear statement rules are grounded in nontextual constitutional values, often called constitutional penumbras. 4 9
The legitimacy of these judicial rules depends upon the legitimacy and
desirability of the normative values on which they rest. Put another
way, clear statement rules that enforce nontextual constitutional
norms are acceptable only so long as the norms exist and apply, and
then only so long as such judicial rules constitute an acceptable means
by which to enforce those norms.5 0 In practice, value-based presumptions, including clear statement rules, are rebuttable in individual
cases when their underlying normative values do not apply as strongly
or when they are counterbalanced by competing values. 5 ' Evidence
that a particular construction of a statute would not substantially
implicate the values that a particular presumption is designed to protect may be adduced relatively easily in individual cases.
B.

Fact-BasedPresumptions

Nearly all of the traditional clear statement rules seem to be
justified by reference to values. However, I propose that factual
assumptions alone can also give rise to presumptions. For example,
fact-based presumptions may rest on the hypothetical intent of similarly situated parties-be they counterparties to a contract, grantors in
a will, or legislatures. This conception may then be used as an aid to
interpreting a particular text or legal question. Unlike value-based
presumptions, which bring abstract legal authorities to bear on a
statute or other text,52 fact-based presumptions use facts to ascertain
the actual meaning of the text.
A nonlegal example is instructive for understanding how factbased presumptions operate. Consider a friend who, when meeting
you for lunch, always specifies one o'clock as the designated meeting
time. After months of consistently scheduling one o'clock lunches, the
49 See Manning, supra note 31, at 406-17 (defining clear statement rules as derived
from constitutional penumbras).
50 See Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 39, at 642 (arguing
that enforcing disfavored constitutional values "at the sub-constitutional level" lacks legitimacy, even if it is normatively desirable); Manning, supra note 31, at 404 (arguing that
constitutional values enforced by clear statement rules do not "meaningfully" relate to the
Constitution and therefore may lack legitimacy).
51 For example, Congress need not use a clear statement when altering the federal-state
balance pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Courts
justify this distinction in part because the Reconstruction Amendments "already altered
the constitutional balance of federal and state powers." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. EEOC,
405 F.3d 840, 850 (10th Cir. 2005). In these cases, the value of federalism is balanced
against the concerns that animated the Reconstruction Amendments.
52 See Manning, supra note 31, at 404-05 (criticizing value-based presumptions on the
ground that abstract values lack provisions to define their scope and limitations).
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friend leaves a telephone message asking to meet for lunch; unfortunately, the meeting time is unintelligible in the recorded message.
Your friend's months of consistent behavior could give rise to a presumption in favor of meeting at one o'clock. This presumption would
largely be devoid of value-based content. Similarly, any situation in
which the past behavior of two similarly situated parties can be
assumed to be a fair guide for future behavior might give rise to a factbased presumption.
Fact-based presumptions, like their value-based counterparts, rely
in part on some broadly applicable legal values. For example, most
fact-based presumptions will rely on the, perhaps charitable, assumption that parties act in a consistent and logical way over time or that
parties in fact possess certain intentions. Fact-based presumptions
assume that the preferences of the reference class of similarly situated
parties will change slowly over time, if at all. Finally, they rely on the
substantive value that consistency in legal outcomes is worthwhile.
However, such values are so diffuse and pervasive in legal reasoning
as to be practically useless for distinguishing among types of
presumptions. The distinguishing characteristic of fact-based presumptions is that they rely on real-world circumstances for interpretive guidance.
It is important to recognize what fact-based presumptions are
not. Occasionally a court requires legislators or litigants to make
certain factual findings before it will authorize action pursuant to a
secondary rule.53 For example, in United States v. Morrison,54 the
Supreme Court struck down a secondary rule for which Congress
made insufficient factual findings.55 In that case, Congress used facts
to buttress what amounted to a legal claim: namely, that the power to
regulate interstate commerce included the power to create a federal
private cause of action against those who commit violent crimes
against women. This congressional Act did not create a fact-based
presumption, which, by contrast, would operate to describe how a
53 I use the term "secondary rule" in the same sense that Professor Hart did: A rule is
secondary if it facilitates the creation or alteration of rules of conduct rather than itself
being a rule of conduct. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 1994) ("[I]n
the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or
must not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules themselves.").
In this way, secondary rules are typically directed at officials. Courts can impose conditions
on official action that, if met, provide the structure for creating new laws. For example, a
court might impose a majority-vote requirement on an act of Congress before it becomes
valid.
54 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
55 Id. at 614-15 (holding that Congress's factual findings that "gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce" were insufficient).
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party such as a legislature has historically acted. Put another way, the
findings in United States v. Morrison were facts not about the way
Congress operates, but rather about the object of a particular piece of
legislation. Fact-based presumptions always must incorporate some
facts about the party whose language or actions are being interpreted.
Fact-based presumptions may become quite difficult for litigants
to overcome if the pattern of behavior underlying the presumption is,
or is perceived to be, very strong. 56 Rebutting a fact-based justification requires either exceptional clarity in the statute-which is
naturally absent in the sort of case in which presumptions of any kind
become relevant-or proof that the facts are false. Proving that the
facts are false is often difficult because the nonexistence of a fact is
difficult to establish conceptually and evidence that would prove it
empirically can be difficult to acquire.57 Further, to say that "similarly
situated" parties "usually" take a particular course of action implies a
stable notion of which parties are similarly situated and what parameters are accurate to evaluate historical tendencies. Given the
difficulty in overcoming fact-based presumptions, it is particularly
important that courts understand the reasons why they continue to
apply such presumptions whose original rationales may be questionable or may have changed. In other words, courts must be careful to
determine, to the extent possible, whether the factual basis for a longstanding presumption actually exists.
The spectrum that divides fact- and value-based canons is a useful
tool for analyzing how canons evolve over time. Although most
federal canons of statutory interpretation seem to be primarily valuebased, some of the most robust value-based canons contain a factbased dimension. Further, political and other nonlegal developments
may dislodge the original value underlying a canon, initiating a shift
toward factual justifications. Envisioning a generalized spectrum of
justifications between values and facts may provide a way to explain a
canon's continued existence after such transformations occur.

56 For more discussion regarding the difficulty in overcoming fact-based presumptions,
see infra Part III.
57 Cf. 11 BERTRAND RUSSELL, What Is an Agnostic?, in THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
BERTRAND RUSSELL 549, 550 (John G. Slater ed., 1997) ("If I were asked to prove that
Zeus and Poseidon and Hera and the rest of the Olympians do not exist, I should be at a
loss to find conclusive arguments.").
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II
ILLUSTRATING THE SPECTRUM WITH THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY

In this Part, I introduce the presumption against extraterritoriality and explain the way it works before demonstrating how this
presumption illustrates the spectrum discussed above. The clearest
way to understand the variety of presumptions on this spectrum is by
tracing the presumption against extraterritoriality over time. While
the presumption against extraterritoriality has become essentially a
fact-based canon, important values once underlay it, and its evolution
toward a fact-based presumption has been gradual.
A.

The Mechanics of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

The Supreme Court has defined the presumption against
extraterritoriality simply: "When a statute gives no clear indication of
an extraterritorial application, it has none."5 "Extraterritorial" means
outside "the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 9 Therefore,
federal statuteS60 will not apply abroad-even to United States citizens-unless Congress expresses a clear intention that they do so. 6 1
The Court also has explained that, to overcome the presumption, it
must find "the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed." 62 Of course, the Court carefully observes that Congress

has the authority to legislate beyond its borders.63 However, whether
58 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
59 Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the presumption assumes
that Congress meant legislation "to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States").
60 The limits on the extraterritorial application of state law are more stringent: State
laws are intended to have effect only within the boundaries of the individual state. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (holding that the application of
Kansas law to a nationwide class action was "sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed
constitutional limits" and remanding to consider the possibility that the law of each class
member's state apply to his or her claim).
61 Occasionally the Supreme Court has referred to the presumption as a clear statement rule, but this is largely a misnomer. Its status as a clear statement rule is at least
controversial. In Aramco, Justice Marshall objected that the majority's opinion transformed a mere presumption against extraterritoriality into a full-fledged clear statement
rule. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 266 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[AJ court is not free to invoke the
presumption against extraterritoriality until it has exhausted all available indicia of
Congress' intent on this subject.").
62 Id. at 248 (majority opinion) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353
U.S. 138, 147 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63 Id. ("Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries
of the United States.").
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Congress has done so in a particular instance is a matter of statutory
interpretation. 64
To understand the presumption against extraterritoriality, it is
useful to examine the facts of EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(Aramco). Although this is a more contemporary application of the
presumption, Aramco-and its facts-places the values that are at
stake with the presumption in clear relief and is therefore instructive.
Ali Boureslan was an American citizen working for an American
corporation, Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), which was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Saudi
Arabia. 65 He began working for an Aramco subsidiary in Houston,
Texas, in 1979, but shortly thereafter asked for, and was granted, a
transfer to work for Aramco in Saudi Arabia. When he was fired by
Aramco in 1984, Boureslan filed charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and then filed suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas against Aramco and its subsidiary for, among other things, violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964-specifically, employment discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, and national origin.66 Aramco filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Boureslan's claim because Title VII did not apply to discrimination by
American corporations against American citizens when the discrimination did not occur within the United States. The district court
granted Aramco's motion, although it observed that the statutory language and legislative history were ambiguous. 67
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had affirmed the
district court opinion.68 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, first laid out the scope and details of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 69 He then considered the petitioners'-both
64 Id. ("Whether Congress has in fact exercised [the] authority [to legislate beyond U.S.
borders] in these cases is a matter of statutory construction.").
65 Id. at 247.
66 See id.; see also Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, or
national origin).
67 See Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 653 F. Supp. 629, 630 (S.D. Tex. 1987), affd, 857 F.2d
1014 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd en banc, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990), affd sub nom. Aramco,
499 U.S. 244 (1991). It is worth noting that the district court cited Foley Bros. for the
proposition that "the absence of a clearly expressed intent creates a presumption that
Congress did not intend extraterritorial application." Id. (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281 (1949)); see also infra Part II.B.3 (describing how Foley Bros. made the presumption fact-based).
68 See Aramco, 499 U.S. 244.
69 See id. at 248.
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Boureslan and EEOC in the consolidated case-two primary arguments. First, the petitioners argued that the broad terms "employer"
and "commerce" as defined in Title VII expressed a congressional
intent that the statute apply to American firms that employ American
citizens abroad. 70 Because the statutory definition of "commerce"
included activity "between a State and any place outside thereof," the
petitioners asserted that Congress intended Title VII to have at least
some extraterritorial effect.71 Aramco responded that the definition
was intended to limit applicability to activity that involved United
States territory in some significant way and to exclude activity that
occurred entirely within the territorial borders of a foreign country.72
Second, the Court considered and rejected the petitioners' argument
that the statute's "alien exemption provision" implicitly included
Americans working abroad within the reach of the statute.73
In addressing the petitioners' first argument, the Supreme Court
found no need to resolve the ambiguity implied by the definition of
"commerce," "as [it] would be required to do in the absence of the
presumption against extraterritorial application." 7 4 The Court
accepted that each side's interpretation was "plausible," although not
entirely persuasive, particularly since the language on which the petitioners relied was common to many statutes that had never been held
applicable outside of the United States. 75 Instead, the Court applied
the presumption, thus siding with Aramco, and explicitly invited
Congress to alter the result by amending Title VII should it so
desire. 76
The stronger of the petitioners' arguments was that the jurisdictional provisions of Title VII logically implied evidence of intent that
the statute should apply extraterritorially. Specifically, the "alien
exemption provision says that the statute 'shall not apply to an
employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any
State." 77 Petitioners argued that to interpret the statute not to apply
to American citizens abroad would render the alien-exemption proviId. at 248-49.
Id. at 249-50 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1982)).
Id. at 250; see also Brief for Respondents Arabian American Oil Co. & Aramco
Services Co. at 21 n.14, Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 (Nos. 89-1838, 89-1845). 1990 WL 511309, at
*21 n.14.
73 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 253-55 (rejecting the petitioners' argument because their interpretation would apply Title VII to foreign employers without clear congressional intent);
see also infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (describing the provision).
74 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 250.
75 Id. at 250-51.
76 See id. at 259 ("Congress, should it wish to do so, may similarly amend Title VII and
in doing so will be able to calibrate its provisions in a way that we cannot.").
77 Id. at 253 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982)).
70
71
72
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sion surplusage.78 Legislative history cited by EEOC in its brief and
quoted by Justice Marshall in his dissent supported this view.79
Although the Court found the petitioners' alternate readings of
the "alien exemption provision" persuasive, it concluded that the negative inference to be drawn from the provision was not a sufficiently
clear statement of congressional intent to give extraterritorial effect to
Title VII.80 Aramco thus squarely raised the question of how clear a
statute must be in order to exert extraterritorial effect. In his dissent,
Justice Marshall noted the Court accepted a negative inferencesimilar to the petitioners' surplusage argument with respect to the
alien-exemption provision-in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 81 as
sufficiently strong evidence of congressional intent to overcome the
"dense armor" of the "clear-statement abrogation rule of Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon."82 Clearly, Aramco demonstrates the
strength of the presumption against extraterritoriality: Interpretations
that would give extraterritorial effect to a statute will not apply unless
they meet a threshold requirement of clarity, even if they are as plausible-or even more plausible-than interpretations that avoid such
an effect.

78 See Brief for the EEOC at 12-13, Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 (Nos. 89-1838, 89-1845),
1990 WL 511330, at *12-13 ("Congress could not rationally have enacted an exemption for
the employment of aliens abroad if it intended to foreclose all potential extraterritorial
applications of the statute.").
79 See H.R. REP. No. 88-570, at 4 (1963) (clarifying that the purpose of the alienexemption provision was to prevent conflicts of laws in cases in which American
companies employed alien workers outside the United States); see also Aramco, 499 U.S.
at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing to and agreeing with the House report); Brief for
the EEOC, supra note 78, at 15-17 (same).
80 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255 ("Without clearer evidence of congressional intent to do
so than is contained in the alien-exemption clause, we are unwilling to ascribe to that body
a policy which would raise difficult issues of international law by imposing this country's
employment-discrimination regime upon foreign corporations operating in foreign
commerce.").
81 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (2006).
82 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 267-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985)). Atascadero required Congress to "express
its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute
itself." 473 U.S. at 243. In Union Gas, the Court held that a negative inference was unmistakable enough to satisfy the Atascadero clear statement rule. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at
7-8. It is worth noting, however, that the majority opinion in Union Gas was authored by
Justice Brennan, who also authored a dissenting opinion in Atascadero, in which he scathingly critiqued the Court's new clear statement rule. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (cataloguing as some of the probable results of the decision "the
unprecedented intrusion on Congress' lawmaking power and consequent increase in the
power of the courts[ and] the development of a complex set of rules to circumvent the
obviously untenable results that would otherwise ensue").
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After Aramco, the presumption against extraterritoriality
enjoyed something of a renaissance.83 Moreover, turning the presumption into a text-only clear statement rule effectively precludes
inquiry into nontextual sources like legislative history and strengthens
the presumption, at least unless or until Congress fully internalized
the new interpretive regime and changed the way it wrote laws.
However, Aramco is not representative of the way in which the
Supreme Court always justified the presumption. Instead, the presumption's history suggests that it changed over time, and may be
continuing to evolve in contemporary decisions. The next Section
traces the presumption's shift from being justified entirely by substantive values grounded in international law to its heavy modern reliance
on facts about how Congress "ordinarily" legislates. This shift has
important practical consequences for litigants who argue that statutes
should apply extraterritorially and logical consequences for the
strength of the presumption itself.
B.

The Evolution of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

The presumption against extraterritoriality slowly evolved from a
value-based presumption to a fact-based presumption. Therefore, this
presumption operates both as an exemplary case for explaining the
differences between value- and fact-based presumptions and as a
noteworthy example of a presumption with justifications that are in
flux. By tracing the history of the presumption, this Section illustrates
how the spectrum of justifications for canons of statutory interpretation proposed in Part I affects judicial presumptions' justifications and
applications.
1.

The Presumption as Value-Based: Avoidance of International
Law Violations

The presumption against extraterritoriality has a history that
spans more than two centuries. In its earliest form, the presumption
resulted from a fusion of the presumption that Congress does not
ordinarily intend to violate the law of nations, known as the Charming
Betsy84 canon, and the nineteenth-century belief in strict territorial
83 Cf Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 39, at 616-17 ("What
ties together Aramco and [other Rehnquist Court international law decisions] is the theme
that the Court is now making it harder for Congress to subject United States companies to
new duties and obligations when they are acting transnationally.").
84 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804).
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limitations on state sovereignty.8 5 This territorial limitation, however,
was not always absolute. 86 For example, courts in the nineteenth century never disclaimed the ability of Congress to apply laws to United
States citizens abroad.8 7 Thus, in its early form, the presumption
against extraterritoriality was based largely on the value of territorial
limitations on sovereignty and analogous paradigms of international
law. That is, according to both domestic and international law at the
time, the laws of two nations should not overlap, and, furthermore, it
was politically undesirable domestically to violate the law of nations,
which hewed to this territorial view of state sovereignty.8 8
CharmingBetsy involved a Danish ship that was seized by French
privateers and then subsequently seized by the U.S.S. Constellation.89
The owner of the Danish ship filed suit for damages against the captain of the Constellation.On appeal to the Supreme Court, the captain
argued that the Danish ship had violated United States lawspecifically, an embargo against France 90 -and therefore was subject
to confiscation. 9 1 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion articulated the
canon that has come to be associated with the case:
[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to
affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of
nations as understood in this country.92
This principle led the Court to limit the scope of the Act creating the
embargo to the territorial borders of the United States and to hold
that the Charming Betsy was not confiscable. However, the final pro85 See Born, supra note 3, at 10 ("During the nineteenth century, a common application
of the Charming Betsy presumption was to incorporate the American understanding that
international law forbids the extraterritorial application of national laws.").
86 See id. at 13-14 (describing some extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction that existed
during the nineteenth century).
87 This principle is most famously affiliated with Blackmer v. United States. See 284 U.S.
421, 437 (1932) (holding that it cannot "be doubted that the United States possesses the
power inherent in sovereignty" to require a citizen abroad to return to the United States to
respond to a subpoena). However, the more general point that Congress may extend the
law outside its own borders "as regards its own citizens" has a longer history. The Apollon,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
88 See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuitof InternationalRecognition, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 947-48 (2010) (arguing that the Constitution was an attempt to ensure
that the United States could "meet its international commitments," including those
imposed by the law of nations, in order to earn other nation-states' trust).
89 See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 115-16.
90 See Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565 (establishing an embargo against France).
91See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 117.
92 Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
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viso of the quoted language foreshadowed one way in which the
Charming Betsy canon could be qualified: The presumption that
Congress does not violate the law of nations may be susceptible to
changing domestic notions of what the law of nations might be. Chief
Justice Marshall seemed to acknowledge that the value underlying the
earliest version of the presumption could change and perhaps
undercut its strength.
At least for the first half of the nineteenth century, the Court was
likely to apply the Charming Betsy canon when it came to reviewing
Congress's ability to impose its laws on noncitizens abroad. 93 Over
time, this application came to rely additionally on the close link
between territorial sovereignty and customary international law-an
even more robust version of the normative value at issue in Charming
Betsy. The Court reaffirmed this strong normative value in The
Apollon,94 which also occurred against a background of heightened
international conflict with France. The French ship Apollon tried to
land her cargo at a port bordering the United States in order to avoid
the payment of an American tonnage fee on French cargo. 95 The
Court narrowly construed the statute that authorized the tonnage fee
so that failure to pay the fee would not give rise to forfeiture. 96 This
portion of the opinion sounded very much like Charming Betsy.
However, the second half of the opinion established the territorial
principle-not the law of nations-as the basis for the decision.
Responding to the plaintiff's argument that the ship was properly
seized because it was in a river bounding the United States, 97 the
Court held that the ship had not entered United States territory 98 and
therefore could not have been seized:
The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories,
except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to
control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own
93 See Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44

L.J. 185, 213-14 (1993) ("The progeny of Charming Betsy apply a strict
presumption against extraterritorial applications in the face of countervailing international
principles.").
94 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
95 See id. at 363-65 (describing the steps that the Apollon took to avoid the fee).
96 See id. at 367-68 (holding that the statute only provides an action in personam
against the ship's master, not in rem for forfeiture of the ship or its cargo).
97 At the time, the St. Mary's River represented the northernmost border of Spanish
Florida. MARK STEIN, How THE STATES GOT THEIR SHAPEs 66 (2008). The plaintiff
argued that the Apollon had entered United States waters and so was subject to the jurisdiction of federal statutes. Cf The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 368-69 (noting that "it is
said" that the forfeiture law applied to the Apollon because "the ship had entered the
district of St. Mary's" and left without making a report).
98 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 369-70.
HASTINGs
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jurisdiction. And, however general and comprehensive the phrases
used in our municipal laws may be, they must always be restricted in
construction, to places and persons, upon whom the Legislature
have authority and jurisdiction."
In so holding, Justice Story fused the territorial concept of jurisdiction
with the Charming Betsy canon against violating the law of nations.
Therefore, in The Apollon, the Court began to erect the presumption against extraterritoriality against the background of the
substantive law of nations as addressed by Charming Betsy. A state's
power could not extend beyond its own borders, so its laws could not
either. Justice Story's opinion demonstrated that this notion of territorial sovereignty was so firmly entwined with the presumption that
the Court did not need to offer any additional justifications for it. The
territorial sovereignty notion remained the dominant justification for
the presumption against extraterritoriality through the late nineteenth
century, acting even as a restraint on the authority of the individual
states.10 0
Applied in this way, the presumption changed again as it came to
span the more modern split between public and private international
law. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,1 0 1
adapted the principle of what was then known as the law of nations to
the developing corpus of conflict-of-laws authorities, with influential
results.102 As a result, conflict-of-laws principles provided an
independent, alternate justification for the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 1 0 3 The presumption remained value-based, but the
value on which the presumption was based continued to change.
While the law of nations had once limited whether a state could legislate outside its borders, conflict-of-laws doctrine provided reasons not
to apply laws extraterritorially even once a state intended to do so.
99 Id. at 370.
100See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (applying a territorial theory of
sovereignty to impose strict limitations on the jurisdiction of state courts over absent
nonresident defendants).
101 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, FOREIGN AND

DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN
REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCEs, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (1834).
102 See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contributionto American Conflicts Law: A
Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230, 250 (1961) (noting the influential value of Story's
Commentaries on the development of the law); see also Born, supra note 3, at 17 ("Later,
the Commentaries provided the foundation for the 'vested rights' theory developed in
Joseph Beale's highly-influential conflict of laws treatise, and thus indirectly for the first
Restatement of Conflict of Laws." (footnote omitted)).
103

See Born, supra note 3, at 16-19 (explaining that the notion that a nation could only

apply its laws within its territory became almost universally accepted during the nineteenth
century and was based in part on conflict-of-laws principles).
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In the early twentieth century, conflict-of-laws principles fused
with the presumption against extraterritoriality in American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co.104 In American Banana, an Alabama corporation alleged that a rival New Jersey corporation had, through
various scandalous turns on the Panamanian road to independence,
deprived it of ownership of one of its banana plantations in Panama in
violation of antitrust laws. 105 The plaintiff brought suit for violations
of the Sherman Act.10 6 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes rejected
the plaintiff's contention that United States law applied to the dispute.
Justice Holmes observed that law "commonly is confined to such
prophecies or threats [as those] addressed to persons living within the
power of the courts."o107 This territorial sovereignty notion, reminiscent of The Apollon, incorporated a robust theory of conflict of laws
given the majority's view that "the general and almost universal rule is
that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." 0 These combined principles, in turn, gave rise to a new rule of construction in
cases of uncertainty: "The foregoing considerations would lead in case
of doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in
its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power."1 09
Thus, the Court in American Banana combined a theory of territorial sovereignty with a substantive principle of international lawi.e., a principle derived from conflict of laws-just as the Court in The
Apollon combined territorial sovereignty theory with Charming
Betsy's value of law-of-nations avoidance. In both The Apollon and
American Banana, the strength of the proposed presumption rested
almost entirely on a thick notion of territorial sovereignty. Absent this
notion, the Court's justifications for the presumption would have been
very weak indeed.
The decisions in The Apollon and American Banana share an

articulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality derived not
from a judicial understanding about how the world of international
law actually is, but rather how it ought to be. Under such an understanding, a judge's role is to interpret legislation that might potentially
offend the law of nations or create conflicts of law so as to avoid such
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
See id. at 354-55 (describing the defendant's efforts to monopolize the banana
market in Panama).
106 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2006).
107 Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 356-57.
108 Id. at 356.
109 Id. at 357.
104
105
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troublesome legal outcomes. This interpretive move is justified by the
assumption that if legislative actors ought not to do something, they
can be presumed not to have done it in the case of ambiguous
legislation. After American Banana, then, if changes in substantive
law eliminated conflicts of laws, the presumption presumably would
become unnecessary because the value of conflict avoidance no longer
has force. This potential for change foreshadows later changes in the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
2. Erosion of the Underlying Value: The Instability of Strict
Territoriality

The decline of the notion of territorial sovereignty did not occur
all at once. Rather, it took place gradually over the course of the first
half of the twentieth century.110 Two cases decided in 1945 provide a
useful benchmark against which to measure this broad decline: United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)"' and InternationalShoe

Co. v. Washington.112 The fact that these cases dealt with entirely distinct areas of the law-antitrust and constitutional due process,
respectively-illustrates that there was a broad sea change that undermined the original justifications for the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
The Alcoa court was confronted squarely with the precedent of
American Banana, which apparently foreclosed the Sherman Act's
application to conspiracies formed outside the United States. Judge
Learned Hand's opinion 13 dealt gingerly with American Banana.
While acknowledging that the presumption against extraterritoriality
incorporated conflict-of-laws principles, Judge Hand recognized an
exception in the form of an "effects" test. 114 Alcoa thus rejected110 See Born, supra note 3, at 29-54 (cataloguing different areas of law in which territorial theories were gradually abandoned or reconsidered).
111 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
112 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The importance of the timing of these and other decisions
expanding the territorial jurisdiction of United States courts has not gone unnoticed. See,
e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: InternationalRelations and American
Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 219, 229 (Miles
Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006) (arguing that strict territorialism decreased as the
U.S. economy became increasingly nationalized).
113 The case was referred to the Second Circuit by designation because the Supreme
Court failed to assemble a quorum to hear the case. At that time, antitrust cases were
appealable directly to the Supreme Court from the district court. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at
421 (noting that the case was referred to the Second Circuit because the Supreme Court
lacked a quorum).
114 As Judge Hand put it, "courts are not to read general words ... without regard to the
limitations .. . which generally correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws.' . . . On
the other hand, it is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
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because of changed legal circumstances-the notion that conflicts
principles imposed strong territorial limits on the Sherman Act, which
is surprising because Judge Hand simultaneously recognized-citing
American Banana-that those principles had previously done so. 1 15
Judge Hand thus struck a blow to the doctrinal international law justification for the presumption against extraterritoriality.
International Shoe similarly marked the decline of territorial
notions of sovereignty. Much as Alcoa synthesized the changes in the
law since American Banana, InternationalShoe sought to eliminate

the Ptolemaic epicycles that had accumulated in personal jurisdiction
doctrine in the decades following Pennoyer v. Neff s territorial
holding.11 6 While International Shoe did not deal with extraterritoriality in the strictest sense, it is illustrative of the broader changes in
the applicable paradigm of jurisdiction, which is relevant to the international extraterritoriality cases. Chief Justice Stone's sparse opinion
in InternationalShoe observed both the historical limitations of territorial jurisdiction and the circumstances that had changed since due
process required a defendant's physical presence to exert jurisdiction.117 As in Alcoa, past precedent already had laid the groundwork
for abandoning territorial theories, but the full break was not evident
until its explication in this watershed opinion. Once the link between
territorial borders and the jurisdiction of courts was severed, the quesnot within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders." Id. at 443.
115 See Born, supra note 3, at 32 ("What Alcoa really said is that if Congressional enactments were to be interpreted in light of concerns about international law, conflict of laws
and 'international complications,' then these concerns ought to reflect contemporary realities and international law doctrine."). Although the road from American Banana to Alcoa
was well-worn with precedent, see R.Y. Jennings, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction and the
United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 161-64 (1957) (describing the
erosion of American Banana's territorial principle), the decision was nonetheless the subject of scrutiny and criticism abroad, see id. at 175 ("There is no doubt that in some of the
antitrust cases of recent years the United States have pushed their claims to extraterritorial
jurisdiction to extreme limits."); see also M. Sornarajah, The ExtraterritorialEnforcement
of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Conflict and Compromise, 31 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 127,127 (1982)
("The position taken by the courts of the United States as to the extraterritorial reach of
the Sherman Act and other U.S. antitrust laws has caused considerable concern to the
States belonging to the Commonwealth." (footnote omitted)).
116 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see also supra note 100 and accompanying text (describing
Pennoyer). Professor Rutherglen noted InternationalShoe's paradigm shift: "International
Shoe replaced this network of detailed exceptions [to a strict territorial principle] with a
single overriding principle .... " George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of
Legal Realism, 2001 Sup. CT. REv. 347, 348.
117 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[N]ow that the capias ad
respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, . . .
he have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] . . . .").
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tion whether a state's laws applied outside its borders became a much
more complex inquiry.
3.

From Value to Fact: Foley Bros.

With the substantive law values that once gave force to the presumption against extraterritoriality drastically altered in the wake of
decisions like Alcoa and American Banana, the status of the pre1 18
sumption itself was uncertain. In 1949, Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo

presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to reconsider the
operation of the presumption. Foley Bros. concerned the applicability
of the Eight-Hour Law' 19 to an employment contract between a
United States company and a private contractor on foreign soil.
Consistent with existing principles of sovereignty, Congress's power to
apply the law to contracts outside the United States was uncontested. 120 The question, therefore, was whether as a matter of
statutory interpretation Congress had in fact done so.1 21
In determining the proper construction of the Eight-Hour Law,
the Foley Bros. Court invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality, but in so doing it offered a new justification for use of the
presumption. The Court's opinion starts with the presumption: "The
canon of construction ... teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States .... ."122 The Court explained the role
of the presumption even though the normative conflicts-avoidance
value it had previously defended no longer applied. The presumption
nonetheless remained "a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent [could] be ascertained." 12 3 This statement bears
unpacking, because it is both novel and exemplary of how the presumption would later come to be justified.
To say that the presumption is a method of determining unexpressed congressional intent means that the presumption is a way of
filling in what Congress intended the law to say, even though it did not
say it. On this reasoning, because Congress usually drafts laws that
apply only within the territorial boundaries of the United States,
courts may assume that Congress intends for its laws not to apply
336 U.S. 281 (1949).
119 Eight-Hour Law, ch. 352, 27 Stat. 340 (1892) (repealed 1962). The law provided an
eight-hour limitation on the workday of federal laborers and mechanics, even if employed
as contractors. Id.
120 Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 284 (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932)).
121Id. at 284-85.
122 Id. at 285.
118

123 Id.
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extraterritorially in any individual case when such intent is uncertain.
If such unexpressed congressional intent underlies the presumption,
then the presumption-by the time of Foley Bros., stripped of its normative theory of territorial sovereignty-is concerned with ensuring
fidelity to congressional intent rather than the protection of a value.
The way to assure fidelity to congressional intent, the Court suggested, was to employ knowledge about how Congress typically acts to
determine how Congress actually acted in a particular instance. Putting aside for one moment whether the presumption tends to achieve
the fidelity it seeks or whether Congress actually tends to legislate
within the territorial boundaries of the United States, the
presumption's justification in Foley Bros. differs greatly from its
justification in American Banana, even though the presumption
appears to operate in much the same way.
The petitioners in Foley Bros. shared the Court's understanding
of the justification for the presumption. The petitioners explained that
the presumption and other related ones "are recognized as aids to
statutory interpretation only because they express the normal intention of a legislative body with respect to the territorial scope of its
enactments." 124 Their conception of the presumption was as a default
rule that gained legitimacy because it constitutes the most common
congressional action when Congress faces analogous circumstances.
The understanding at the time, as reflected in the Court's opinion in
Foley Bros., was that the presumption was grounded in facts about the
world, namely that Congress usually wrote laws that were designed to
regulate events within United States territorial boundaries.
4.

Confusion Between Value and Fact: Aramco Rejuvenates the
Presumption

The Court applied the presumption somewhat erratically in the
wake of Foley Bros.125 The next major decision applying the presumption was Aramco, more than forty years later. 126 Aramco offered
124 Brief for Petitioners at 15, Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 281 (No. 91), 1948 WL 47265, at *15.
The respondent-unsurprisingly-did not rely on the presumption in attempting to persuade the Court to give extraterritorial effect to the statute, nor did it object to the
petitioners' characterization of the presumption. See Brief for Respondent at 12-16, Foley
Bros., 336 U.S. 281 (No. 91), 1948 WL 47266, at *12-16 (arguing that the petitioners,
through their characterization of the presumption, have placed themselves in the "unenviable and anomalous position of supporting alien labor to the detriment of American
laborers").
125 See Dodge, supra note 47, at 91-92 & 91 n.44 (describing cases that dealt with
extraterritoriality issues but were sufficiently distinguishable from extraterritoriality cases
to justify the Court's decision not to apply the presumption).
126 See supra notes 65-83 and accompanying text (discussing Aramco).
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yet another novel vision of the presumption-one that came with
added justifications. After quoting the language from Foley Bros.
discussed above, 127 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the presumption "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord." 128 Aramco thus presented two justifications for its invocation of the presumption against extraterritoriality-one based on facts
about the world and another based on conflict-of-laws concerns. The
factual justification came from Foley Bros. and reflected the newer
conception of the presumption in the wake of declining notions of territorial sovereignty. 129 The conflict-of-laws value justification, however, appeared to be conditional at best: It required at least the
possibility of actual clashes between laws of the United States and
other countries.
To support the conflict-of-laws justification, Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras,130 a 1963 case that addressed whether the National Labor
Relations Act1 31 applied to foreign ships with foreign crews operating
partially in United States waters. However, McCulloch dealt more
directly with a conflict-of-laws issue than an extraterritoriality question, given that the ships in question traveled frequently in United
States territory.132 Even under a traditional notion of territorial sovereignty, it was perfectly acceptable for United States law to apply to
the ships, at least while they were in United States waters. In this way,
McCulloch and a related case, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
S.A.,133 dealt with legal issues that were importantly different from
127 See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's interpretation
of the presumption in Foley Bros.).
128 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963)).
129 See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the decline of territorial notions of sovereignty in
justifying the presumption).
130 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
131 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
132 See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 18-19 (noting that the ships "operat[ed] in a regular
course of trade between foreign ports and those of the United States"). The Court in
McCulloch quotes Charming Betsy to exhume the old "law of nations" presumption
against extraterritoriality. Id. at 21 (quoting Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804)). Of course, a mere question of ambiguous congressional intent about a law's
extraterritorial application would not run up against Chief Justice Marshall's concerns in
Charming Betsy, at least not since the beginning of the twentieth century. See supra Part
II.B.1-2 (describing the decline of the notion of territorial sovereignty over the first half of
the twentieth century).
133 353 U.S. 138 (1957). Benz involved whether the Labor Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act applied to a picket line on a foreign-flag ship operated by foreigners while it
was in U.S. waters. Id. at 138-39. The existence of conflicting foreign law was patent, and
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the ones at issue in either Foley Bros. or Aramco. 1 3 4 Although a presumption that enforces the international law value of comity for ships
traveling in territorial waters might be acceptable or even desirable,135
it is not grounded in a factual understanding of how Congress
behaves. A direct application of Foley Bros. would suggest the latter
rationale. The most vivid demonstration of the practical difference
between presumptions grounded upon each of these bases would be a
case with facts similar to McCulloch, but in which there were no possibility of conflicting laws. 136 Would the presumption still apply?
Neither McCulloch nor Benz presented this question, and neither
purported to answer it. This lingering uncertainty demonstrates the
difficulty of disentangling the various justifications for the
presumption against extraterritoriality and the way that value-based
and fact-based justifications can operate alongside each other.
Finally, the Court in Aramco "assume[d] that Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality."13 7
This new factual justification for the presumption follows from the
Court's plan to decline to construe statutes to have an extraterritorial
effect "unless there is 'the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed."' 138 Taken together, the Court implied that there is
repeated interaction between Congress and courts: Courts interpret
statutes with an understanding about how Congress normally acts, and
Congress legislates with an understanding about how courts normally
interpret statutes. Note that, for this interplay to work, neither branch
needs to follow the presumption each time it acts. It is enough that
each branch follows the presumption most of the time, since isolated
deviations do not alter the best guess about intent or interpretation in
subsequent interactions.
the peculiar nature of domestic jurisdiction over foreign-flag ships in American waters
made the conflict-of-laws issue yet more remote:
It is beyond question that a ship voluntarily entering the territorial limits of
another country subjects itself to the laws and jurisdiction of that country. The
exercise of that jurisdiction is not mandatory but discretionary. Often, because
of public policy or for other reasons, the local sovereign may exert only limited
jurisdiction and sometimes none at all.
Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
134 See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (introducing an operationalized distinction between McCulloch and Benz).
135 Cf Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 39, at 640 (suggesting
that some value-driven clear statement rules may be examples of justifiable judicial
activism).
136 See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (discussing just such a case, Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993)).
137 Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
138 Id. (quoting Benz, 353 U.S. at 147).
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This implied interaction between Congress and the judiciary suggests that if Congress had evidence that courts would not apply the
presumption, Congress might legislate vaguely on the question of
extraterritoriality. Contrariwise, if the judiciary had any evidence that
Congress intended a particular statute to have extraterritorial effect, it
would be appropriate to abandon the presumption. In either case, the
amount of evidence required before one branch would not apply the
presumption would depend on the strength of the observation of the
behavior underlying the presumption.139 The observed behavior, in
turn, is a fact about the world-which is to say it is contestable,
mutable, and at least in theory susceptible to empirical evaluation.
The Aramco Court's assumption that Congress legislates with
knowledge of the presumption does not obviously fit with the valuebased justifications for two reasons. First, the assumption militates for
stability of canons in general rather than for any one canon or
another. The same logic would apply to an entirely arbitrary rule of
construction so long as Congress were presumed to know about the
rule. Second, although the assumption might justify future invocations
of the presumption based on congressional notice of the judicial practice, it necessarily fails to justify invoking presumptions in a specific
case in which the facts would not provide Congress with notice that
the presumption could apply. In such a case, a court arguably should
show that Congress in fact legislated against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality before applying the presumption.
The increased difficulty of justifying the presumption's application in
individual cases does not mean that it ought not to be invoked.
However, this difficulty distinguishes the factual assumption from previous value-based justifications for the presumption, which each provided value-based reasons for application in each case.
The assumption that Congress legislates against the backdrop of
the presumption against extraterritoriality may provide a reason not
to look beyond a statute's plain text for evidence of congressional purpose. After all, if Congress were aware that courts would not give
effect to anything beyond a statute's text, it should include more detail
in the statute itself, as opposed, for example, to the legislative history.
This reasoning holds true only if the backdrop against which Congress
legislates has the same contours as the backdrop assumed by courts.
In other words, if the presumption were to change, the problem of
notice would remain. In Foley Bros., legislative history constituted an

139 Cf Listokin, supra note 23, at 369-70 (arguing that defaults can become sticky if
majoritarian behavior-what most parties want-is sufficiently common).
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important part of the analysis. 140 The Court discussed legislative history in Benz as well. 141 Such cases provided Congress with some
reason to believe that a court would utilize evidence of its intent for
statutes to apply territorially, if contained in legislative history.
5.

The Vitality of the New Fact-BasedJustification

Aramco left open one very important issue: whether the presumption was justified by the value of preventing "unintended
clashes" between United States laws and the laws of other nations.142
If that were the primary justification, as some language in Aramco
suggested, then the presumption would apply with much less force in
cases involving no possibility of such clashes. In two cases decided two
years after Aramco, the Court rejected this value-based understanding
of the presumption and relied solely on justifications rooted in facts
about the world.
In Smith v. United States,143 the Supreme Court considered the

novel question of whether the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)144
applied to Antarctica, a continent without any tort law. This case is
useful analytically because it involved no possibility of a clash
between United States law and the law of any other sovereign. The
petitioner-a survivor bringing a wrongful death suit under the FTCA
for acts of negligence that occurred while the decedent worked as a
carpenter at a scientific station-argued that the presumption should
not apply in the absence of the possibility of a conflict of laws.14 5 The
Court dismissed the argument in a brief, but significant, footnote:
"[T]he presumption is rooted in a number of considerations, not the
least of which is the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind." 146 Unfortunately, the Court
did not elaborate the other considerations to which it referred.
140 See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286-88 (1949) (examining the EightHour Law's legislative history).
141 See Bent, 353 U.S. at 144 (examining the Labor Management Relations Act's legislative history). The opinion in McCulloch, however, is dismissive of legislative history. See
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20 (1963) ("We
continue to believe that if the sponsors of the original Act or of its amendments conceived
of the application now sought by the Board they failed to translate such thoughts into
describing the boundaries of the Act as including foreign-flag vessels manned by alien
crews.").
142 Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
143 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
144 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2006).
145 See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 16-17, Smith, 507 U.S. 197 (No. 91-1538), 1992
WL 511965, at *16-17 (arguing that the presumption should not apply because "Antarctica
is 'sovereignless"').
146 Smith, 507 U.S. at 204 n.5.
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However, Smith definitively weakened the possibility that avoiding a
conflict of laws is the value justification for the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Instead, the Court effectively promoted a factbased justification for the presumption.
The fact-based justification for the presumption against
extraterritoriality was strengthened in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc.147 In Sale, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had not

applied the presumption to certain provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952148 because the applicable section would not
interfere with other nations' laws.149 The Supreme Court, citing Smith,
rejected the court of appeals' reasoning, reiterating that "the presumption has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict
with the laws of other nations."150 However, as in Smith, there was no
hint of what other justifications might apply in place of the conflict-oflaws value.
A third case, Small v. United States,151 did not directly concern

the application of the extraterritoriality presumption, but the Court
nevertheless used the case as an opportunity to elaborate on the justifications for the presumption. The Small Court faced the question of
whether a law prohibiting gun ownership by those convicted of a
crime included as underlying crimes those "entered in a foreign
court."1 5 2 Holding that it did not, the Court explained that "the legal
presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have
domestic, not extraterritorial, application" is derived from the "commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic
concerns in mind." 153 The Court thus clarified its position that a set of
facts about how Congress normally legislates "led the Court to adopt"
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 154
The path from a value-based to an increasingly fact-based justification for the presumption against extraterritoriality has not been
perfectly smooth, and the Court still offers a value-based version of
the presumption in specific contexts. For example, in F. Hoffmann-La
509 U.S. 155 (1993).
Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1537 (2006)).
149 Smith, 507 U.S. at 173-74.
150 Id. at 174.
151 554 U.S. 385 (2005).
152 Id. at 388. The petitioner in the case had been convicted of a crime in Japan, for
which he had served a prison term. Upon his return to the United States, he purchased a
firearm and was subsequently charged with illegal possession because of his prior conviction. The petitioner challenged his illegal possession conviction, arguing that the illegal
possession statute was not supposed to consider his Japanese conviction. See id. at 387.
153 Id. (quoting Smith, 507 U.S. at 204 n.5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154 Id. at 388.
147
148
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Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran),155 the Supreme Court

once again appeared to embrace comity as a substantive value justifying the presumption. However, Empagran dealt narrowly with a
specific statutory amendment to an otherwise sweeping antitrust law
that applied extraterritorially. Congress drafted a law exempting certain conduct having only foreign effects from the Sherman Act, which
Alcoa had held to apply extraterritorially. 156 Thus, the Court was
asked to interpret a statutory provision that was apparently explicitly
designed to restrict extraterritorial application. In choosing to do so,
the Court cited McCulloch for the proposition that it would
"construe[] ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations."' 57 This is a subtly different presumption than the one at work in cases like Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd. because Empagran relies on the value of

comity, 5 8 and this difference further illustrates
McCulloch and Benz are not, strictly speaking,
sumption against extraterritoriality. Arguably,
understood as a straightforward application
Charming Betsy canon because it involved the
conflicting laws. 159

the degree to which
cases about the preEmpagran is better
of the traditional
actual possibility of

Like Empagran, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.160 is arguably

another isolated instance of value-based justification for the presumption. In Microsoft, the Court suggested that the presumption
against extraterritoriality "applies with particular force in patent
law."1 61 The Court explained that, in the intellectual property context,
"foreign law may embody different policy judgments about the relative rights of inventors, competitors, and the public in patented
inventions." 1 6 2 Even so, the Court tempered this subject area specific

155 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
156 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, 96
Stat. 1233, 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)).
157 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164.
158 See supra notes 6-18 and accompanying text (discussing Morrison); infra notes
164-73 and accompanying text (same).
159 Cf John H. Knox, The Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality,104 AM. J. INT'L
L. 351, 355-61 (2010) (drawing a distinction between the approach in Empagran and the
extraterritoriality canon espoused by the Rehnquist Court); see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Charming Betsy canon).
160 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
161 Id. at 454-55.

162 Id. at 455 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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statement about the presumption by rephrasing a version of the factbased justification. 163
This history provides the backdrop for Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd.,164 the Court's most recent statement of the presumption. The Morrison Court directly incorporated this recent body
of precedent into the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Morrison raised the question of whether section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934165 applied extraterritorially. 166 This was a longstanding question of statutory interpretation on which various courts
of appeals had developed significant case law. 167 Notwithstanding the
substantial lower court precedent holding that section 10(b) applied
extraterritorially, the Court began its exercise in statutory interpretation by reciting the presumption and citing both Smith and Sale.168
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, also chastised the Second
Circuit and other courts for disregarding the presumption. 169
The Morrison opinion also addressed two questions that lingered
after Aramco. First, Justice Scalia confirmed that the presumption
rests on an assumption that Congress legislates with the knowledge
that courts apply the presumption against extraterritoriality. 170 The
virtues of such an approach, as articulated in Morrison, are the traditional arguments in favor of stable interpretive default rules. Foremost
163 See id. ("[C]ourts should 'assume that legislators take account of the legitimate
sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws."' (quoting F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004))).
164 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
165 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
166 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875 (describing the issue as "whether § 10(b) ... provides a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for
misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges").
167 See, e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121-24 (1995) (using a mixture of
the conducts test and an effects test to find extraterritorial application of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act), abrogatedby Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. Several other circuit
courts of appeals followed the Second Circuit's balancing test. See In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec.
Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009) (determining the extent of subject matter jurisdiction under the Second Circuit's conduct test), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869;
cf Cont'1 Grain (AustI.) Proprietary Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir.
1979) (using a different test to find section 10(b) applied extraterritorially), abrogatedby
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
168 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78 ("The ... presumption applies regardless of
whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law." (citation omitted)).
169 Id. at 2878 ("Despite this principle of interpretation, long and often recited in our
opinions, the Second Circuit believed that, because the Exchange Act is silent as to the
extraterritorial application of § 10(b), it was left to the court to 'discern' whether Congress
would have wanted the statute to apply.").
170 See id. at 2881 (explaining that the Court applies the presumption in all cases to
create "a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable
effects").
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among these benefits is that the presumption allows Congress to "legislate with predictable effects."1 71 Second, the Morrison opinion
addressed the relationship between the presumption and nontextual
sources. Although Justice Scalia opposes on principle the use of
nontextual sources like legislative history, 172 he dismissed the notion
that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a clear statement
rule in the sense that it prohibits the use of context beyond the literal
text of the statute. 173
Morrison left no doubt about the importance that the Supreme
Court places on the application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality by lower courts. It also affirmed the primacy of
justifications for the presumption based not in values-like comity of
international law-but in facts about the world-like ordinary congressional behavior and the fact that Congress legislates against the
background of judicial interpretation. Because of the statute-bystatute manner in which the presumption must be applied, its contours
will continue to be the subject of Supreme Court decisions. Last Term,
for example, the Court granted certiorari to determine, among other
issues, whether the presumption applied to a particular doctrine of
copyright law. The case,. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A.,174

was affirmed 4-4, with Justice Kagan recusing, a vote breakdown that
practically guarantees the issue will arise again in the near future.
This Part demonstrated that the presumption against extraterritoriality has undergone a dramatic transformation over the last 200
years, focusing on the shift in justifications for the presumption.
Whereas values derived from principles of the customary international
law and conflict of laws once supported the presumption, now observations about the way in which Congress usually legislates are usually
its basis. This shift from value-based justifications to fact-based justifications has profound implications for understanding the
presumption against extraterritoriality in particular and canons of
statutory interpretation in general.

171

Id.

172 ANTONIN SCALIA,

A

MATTER OF INTERPRETATION

29-37 (1997).

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 ("[W]e do not say, as the concurrence seems to think,
that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a 'clear statement rule,' if by that is
meant a requirement that a statute say 'this law applies abroad.' Assuredly context can be
consulted as well." (citation omitted)).
174 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (per curiam).
173
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III
OBSTACLES TO REBUTTING FACT-BASED PRESUMPTIONS

Describing the shift in the presumption against extraterritoriality
from value-based justifications to fact-based justifications does not
answer the question whether such a shift is a positive development.
Some may see this as positive because they object to value-based presumptions, 175 but value-based clear statement rules have their
defenders.176 More important to assess normatively is how the
presumption has shifted to a new factual basis and grown stronger at
the same time. Given that the history in Part II.B showed that this
change has resulted from the deterioration of its original rationale, the
Court's approach may be backward: A fact-based presumption
without overwhelming facts should be weaker than a value-based
presumption.
This Part considers the theoretical consequences of a shift from a
value-based presumption to a fact-based one. Fact-based presumptions are susceptible to two primary types of attack. First, the
"facts" assumed by courts as congressional baseline behavior may not
be well-defined or may be difficult to ascertain, undermining the justification for a fact-based presumption. Second, background facts may
change over time, which should require the presumption to change
with the facts, but that, in turn, requires the judiciary keep abreast of
these changes. Given these concerns and the uncertainty surrounding
the facts upon which the presumption against extraterritoriality rests,
the presumption is arguably unjustifiably strong in its current form.
Consider a litigant who seeks to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality in an individual case. Were the presumption
175 See supra notes 45 and 50 for examples of such criticism.
176 See, e.g., Young, supra note 30, at 1585-93 (defending constitutionally based clear
statement rules); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action:
ConstitutionalDoctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118
YALE L.J. 2, 33-34, 40 (2008) (defending clear statement rules as a means to increase the
cost on Congress to push the boundaries of constitutional values).
Whether the presumption against extraterritoriality makes sense as a value-based presumption necessarily depends on whether its underlying value is worth protecting and
whether its application protects the value. Professors Bradley and Dodge have identified
five primary values that the presumption supports: international law, comity, choice of law,
ordinary congressional intent, and separation of powers. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 513-16 (1997)
(developing this list of.reasons for the presumption); see also Dodge, supra note 47, at
112-22 (evaluating Bradley's justifications seriatim). But the change in underlying international law may mean that the presumption is not protecting any existing values. See Born,
supra note 3, at 99-100 (arguing that the presumption should be abolished and replaced
with a presumption that laws apply extraterritorially when doing so would be consistent
with principles of public and private international law).
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against extraterritoriality rooted solely in the idea that laws should be
construed to avoid conflicts with the laws of other nations, a litigant's
rebuttal of the presumption would be straightforward. She would only
need to show that there was no possibility-or a very low
probability-of international conflict. This sort of situation would be
common when international standards were uniform across jurisdictions. Such a situation also would arise when other nations had no
relevant law that could conflict with the domestic law. By contrast,
when the presumption is not rooted in comity values but in an understanding about how Congress "ordinarily" legislates, it becomes very
difficult for a litigant to rebut the presumption. There are two
obstacles to a showing that Congress does not ordinarily legislate in a
particular way: One is definitional, and the other is practical. The definitional problem is that it is difficult to determine what it means to say
that Congress ordinarily behaves in a certain way, and such an understanding would be necessary for courts to identify when Congress
ceases to behave in that way to allow rebuttal of the presumption.
Practically, even if the definition were clear, litigants would have difficulty gathering convincing evidence about the way in which Congress
actually legislates if they are trying to show that Congress did not act
with the presumption in mind with respect to a particular piece of
legislation.
A.

The Definitional Hurdles

Three problems arise in defining a congressional tendency to legislate with respect to conditions within the United States. As
explained by the Court's footnote in Smith, "Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind."' 77 But what is the
denominator in the implied fraction? Likely the fraction is the number
of laws with domestic concerns in mind divided by the number of all
relevant laws. "Relevant laws" is a narrow group. Only a subset of the
laws Congress writes could possibly apply extraterritorially, so perhaps completely domestic legislation, such as that concerning Washington, D.C., or national parks, should not weigh in the calculus of
whether a law to prevent international tax fraud applies extraterritorially. Further, considerations of typical congressional behavior may
also need to be sensitive to differences in substantive law. There are
reasons to believe that Congress is more likely to write laws that apply
extraterritorially in certain substantive areas, such as antitrust and
177 Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993); see also supra notes 143-46 and
accompanying text (discussing Smith).
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tax.178 For example, Congress recently passed the Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act, 179 which imposes substantial extraterritorial
withholding and reporting requirements on foreign financial institutions and other foreign entities. 80 If there are substantial differences
in the likelihood that Congress legislates extraterritorially when it legislates with respect to different substantive areas of the law, the general presumption might become a series of varying area-specific
presumptions.
It is also unclear what the terms "generally" and "ordinarily"
mean when a court says it is assuming how Congress generally or ordinarily behaves.181 Congress might legislate with respect to foreign
conditions one-fourth of the time. Would that low percentage be
enough to rebut the presumption? Further, Congress may change its
behavior by suddenly stopping or starting to legislate extraterritorially, which would require courts to determine the length of time
during which Congress must act in a particular way before that
behavior becomes the way in which Congress "ordinarily" acts. Similarly, congressional behavior might change with each session, as
Congress's membership changes. An extraterritorially active Congress
might legislate extraterritorially in three-fourths of its laws, while the
next Congress might legislate extraterritorially in only one-twentieth
of its laws. This type of line-drawing problem compounds the denominator problem noted above. When combined, these two hurdles mean
that it is unclear both how to calculate the relevant percentage-the
number of statutes that apply extraterritorially out of some broader
pool of statutes-and against which yardstick to measure that
percentage.
The final definitional hurdle relates to which Congress is the
object of the observation. Consider Morrison, which interpreted a
portion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.182 In applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, it is unclear whether the Court
considered the way in which Congress ordinarily legislates by looking
at the Congress that enacted the statute in 1934, or the Congress in
178 For a discussion of increasing extraterritoriality in the antitrust area despite comity
concerns, see Developments in the Law-Extraterritoriality,124 HARV. L. REV. 1226,
1269-79 (2011); supra Part II.B.2.
179 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1474 (Supp. IV 2010). The law was part of the HIRE Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 23, 26, and 49 U.S.C.).
180 See id. §§ 1471-1472.
181 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (noting that Smith assumed how Congress
"generally legislates"); supra note 153 and accompanying text (noting that Small assumed
what Congress "ordinarily intends").
182 See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875 (2010) (interpreting
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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session at the time of the decision in 2010.183 Given the significant
lengths to which legislatures go to make deals stick and bind future
Congresses,'" the difference is critical-if all Congresses had the

same preferences, no precommitment would be necessary. Further,
the historical frame of reference matters greatly because of the enormous developments in international law generally, and the
presumption against extraterritoriality specifically, over the last two
centuries.185
B.

The PracticalHurdles

Even if the Supreme Court were to articulate a clear definition of
"ordinarily," substantial hurdles would remain for individual litigants
who must gather evidence to rebut the presumption. The extraterritoriality question operates on a statute-by-statute basis. Each time the
question arises in the context of a particular statute, it must be
answered either by the explicit language of the statute or by a judicial
consideration that involves the presumption against extraterritoriality.
It may be argued that if the Supreme Court considers the
extraterritoriality question once per statute, and if Congress has the
power to override statutory interpretations by the Court, the problem
would be solved after the first Supreme Court litigation, and few
people would be affected.186 However, this criticism overlooks the
considerable scholarly and legal attention to the application of clear
statement rules in general, and the presumption against extraterritoriality in particular. Further, because the Court often interprets statutes
decades after their original enactment, as was true in Morrison and
Aramco, the Court may set the status quo with respect to the
Congress in place at the time of the decision. Put differently, it is
unclear whether the Court would consider the way in which Congress
"usually" legislates from the standpoint of 1934 or 2010, or even
whether the Court views this distinction as important for the application of the presumption. For litigants, this renders the Court's implementation of the presumption a moving target.
183 Accepted judicial practice would tend to favor the former. See, e.g., Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 313 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he objective manifestations of congressional intent to create a private right of action must be measured in light of
the enacting Congress' expectations as to how the judiciary might evaluate the question."
(emphasis added)).
184 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal,
111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002) (describing legislative attempts to bind future Congresses and
intervention by courts to prevent such legislation).
185 See supra Part II.B (tracing some of these developments).
186 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 31, at 400-01 (discussing the idea that clear statement
rules allow Congress to come back and amend statutes).
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The Court's last-mover power is especially strong because it
allows the Court to set a policy that exists distinct from either
Congress's preferred outcome.187 Given the large number of cases
involving extraterritoriality that also involve plaintiffs bringing suit
against corporations, this policy wedge may prove to have significant
political consequences. The existence of such a procedural mechanism
can permanently shift the policy equilibrium.' 88 A blanket rule, which
was supported by an empirical observation about the behavior of
Congress and did not shift over time, could give a court substantial
freedom to reach a result that differs from the one that would be
favored by the enacting Congress or the current congressional
majority. If a court's prerogative were to provide additional
protections to corporate defendants than those intended by Congress,
the presumption against extraterritoriality would permit that result.
Given that the justifications for the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of statutes evolved from primarily valuebased to primarily fact-based, the difficulty that any litigant would
have in rebutting the new form of the presumption and the potentially
profound political consequences of the transformation suggest that
the presumption is unjustifiably strong. I argue that a much weaker
version should replace its current form, so that it only applies in the
complete absence of any evidence of congressional intent on the
extraterritoriality question. Further, courts ought to be vigilant about
reevaluating their assumption that Congress ordinarily legislates with
domestic concerns in mind: They should be sensitive to different
trends in extraterritoriality in different substantive areas of the law,
and they should be more explicit about the facts Congress employs.
Given the scope of changes in the presumption over the 200 years
since Charming Betsy, it is not inconceivable that a major factual
claim that provides support for the modern version of the presumption could become false at some point in the future. If the
presumption's factual underpinnings were false, the presumption in its
general form would no longer be justifiable.

187 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523, 549 (1992) (demonstrating that, under certain circumstances, "jiudicial
review introduces the Court as a decisionmaker that can create a new default position");
cf KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 20-48 (1998)
(presenting a theoretical framework in which being the first mover in a multistage game
allows for deviation from the legislative median).
188 See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 187, at 528-33 (formalizing a positive-political
theoretical model of bicameralism, presentment, and judicial review, and demonstrating
how it can result in changes in the political equilibrium).
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CONCLUSION

This Note argued that the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of statutes underwent a fundamental shift starting with
Foley Bros. While it was once supported by robust, transsubstantive
notions of territorial sovereignty, the values that support the presumption against extraterritoriality are now largely limited to specific
areas of law. As the values on which the presumption historically
rested eroded, the presumption found a new justification. This Note
proposed that the new justification is grounded in an ostensibly
empirical observation about how Congress actually behaves and thus
is primarily fact-based. The general story of changing justifications is
one that applies to many different legal rules.
This Note also proposed a spectrum between value- and factbased presumptions that may shed light on the way in which other
canons have evolved as well. Value-based canons that are not
grounded in quasi-constitutional values-such as the federalism and
constitutional avoidance canons-may be the most susceptible to
shifting along this spectrum, but the path of constitutional change in
the United States demonstrates that even constitutional values like
federalism are contestable and may shift over time. If this occurs,
courts may continue to look to empirical observations about congressional behavior to ground canons of interpretation that were once
based on constitutional values. These empirical observations should
be testable by litigants interested in avoiding a presumption and, if
found to be incorrect by courts, rebuttable because Congress did not
legislate with a particular presumption in mind. Courts should frame
their assumptions about congressional behavior in ways that are clear
and verifiable to ensure that canons of interpretation are not retained
beyond their useful life.
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